From the NYT in May 16, 2016: The China Electronics Standardization Institute reportedly advised that “…as the world connects to the Internet, various forms of attacks and new defensive technologies are ever multiplying, bringing challenges to China’s development of a new digital industry.” Whether considering China’s national interest, Apple’s proprietary interest, or my personal and financial interest, data (and program) protection is two-faced. For example, my security and confidentiality interests can conflict with U.S. national / Apple proprietary interests. As an individual familiar with notices of potential and actual compromises of identity from sources such as financial institutions, payment processors, and the federal government, I am occasionally overwhelmed with the risk of abuse resulting from data (and programs) getting into the wrong hands, especially where they were originally housed with trusted persons (e.g., employers, insurers, etc.) With sensitive personal data (e.g., alleged offenses / crimes) available to anyone with the right key (e.g., PIN), restricting the definition of the right key is essential.
Of course, making my digital defense impregnable entails walling off others’ interests and digital capacities, including the U.S. and Apple. Where governance and policy are shared among the governors, managers, and other interested persons, there should be trade-offs and reasoned and fair compromises (e.g., allegations of threats to national security must be more than routine and unsubstantiated cover). How are these conflicts mediated (cf. FISA court)? Issues disclosed under scandals such as the Panama Papers exemplify that inspection and oversight on a global basis is less than satisfactory (cf. EU data protection).
The hacking criminals are conspiracies among digital guerillas of international and domestic sources. They may be winning.